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Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs:

Theory, Practice, and Performance

John K. Stranlund, Carlos A. Chavez, and Barry C. Field
Combining an analysis of the compliance incentives faced hy firms
in an emissions trading program, a comprehensive review of the enforcnnent
strategics employed in Sulfur Dioxide Allowance and the Regional Clean Air
lncenlives Market (RECLAIM) programs, and a review of the compliance per
formance of these programs thus .far; we are able to propose several practical
guidelines for enf arcing emissions trading programs. We stress the importance
of prevailing market prices .for emissions permits in determining compliance
incentives, the importance of accurately measuring firms' emissions, and the
importance of implementing enforcement strategies that remove the incentives
firms may have to falsify emissions reports.

Introduction
Emission trading programs (also referred to as transferable or tradable pol
lution rights and cap-and-trade policies) are an innovative approach to controlling
pollution that continues to gather support from policymakers and members of the
regulated community. Conceptually, emissions trading programs are quite simple yet
have very powerful implications. The typical design of a market-based system
requires first that an environmental authority decide on an acceptable level of over
all emissions. Permits consistent with that target, each of which confer the right to
release a certain amount of pollution over some period of time, are then issued to
polluting firms. Facilities may apply these permits to their own emissions, sell
excess permits to other pollution sources, or purchase permits from other firms if
their emissions exceed their permit holdings. If the coverage of the system is exten
sive enough and there are no serious institutional barriers to trading, an active mar
ket in emissions permits is established. By exploiting the power of a market to allo
cate pollution control responsibilities and by freeing facilities to choose the cheap
est way to reduce their emissions, well-designed trading programs promise to
achieve environmental quality goals more cheaply than traditional command-and
control regulations. 1
Despite the perceived advantages of market-based environmental policies
over traditional command-and-control approaches, a number of authors have made
it clear that the efficiency gains realized by emissions trading programs will depend
on rates of compliance, which in turn will depend on the enforcement processes and
activities pursued by those running the programs (Keeler, 1991; Malik, 1990, 1992;
van Egteren &: Weber, 1996). Others have provided conceptual analyses of how
enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs should be designed to
achieve high rates of compliance in a cost-effective manner (Beavis&: Walker, 1983;
Stranlund&: Dhanda, 1999; Stranlund &: Chavez, 2000). Almost no effort has been
devoted to describing the enforcement practices and compliance performance of
actual emissions trading programs.

Over the years, regulatory agencies have built administrative and legal sys
tems to enforce the conventional command-and-control type of environmental reg
ulation. Enforcement in a command-and-control world works by detecting and
sanctioning performance that fails to meet the established standards. If a polluter
has emissions in excess of the legal standard, the only way to move toward compli
ance is to reduce emissions toward the standard. But polluters in an emissions trad
ing program have another option. If they have emissions in excess of their permit
holdings, they can do two things to come into compliance: reduce emissions or pur
chase more permits. In an emissions trading system, therefore, regulators face a
somewhat more complex enforcement problem. They must now focus both on emis
sions and on the behavior of firms in emission permit markets. This suggests that
successful enforcement must now be undertaken in coordination with the permit
markets.
In this article, we combine a conceptual model of compliance incentives in
emissions trading programs with descriptions of the enforcement practices and com
pliance performance of actual programs to develop practical guidelines for enforcing
these programs. The article proceeds as follows: We first present a model of the com
pliance incentives of firms in an emissions trading program. Then, we turn to an
account of the enforcement strategics employed in the two most prominent market
based systems: the Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Trading program (S0 2 ) and the
Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program. These programs have
been described and discussed extensively (e.g., by Schwarze&: Zapfel, 2000), but to
our knowledge, no one has focused as clearly on their enforcement provisions.
Armed with a conceptual understanding of the compliance incentives in emissions
trading programs and knowledge of the how the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs are
enforced, we evaluate the compliance performance of these two programs thus far.
Taken altogether-theory, practice, and performance-we are able to develop sever
al practical guidelines for enforcing emissions trading programs, which we lay out
in our concluding section.

Compliance Incentives in a Transferable Emissions Permit System
To provide a context for an examination of the structure of the compliance
incentives faced by firms in an emission trading system, we first briefly review the
basic elements of the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs.

Basics of the 502 and RECLAIM Programs
The EPA's Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Trading Program, which is part of the
U.S. Acid Rain Program implemented under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, was designed to reduce annual S0 2 emissions from fossil-fueled elec
tric utility units by almost 10 million tons, nearly 50% of the 1980 emissions levels. 2
The S0 2 program was designed to run in two phases. Phase I operations began in
1995, affecting a total of 445 units. Phase II of the program, which began in the year
2000, extended the coverage of the program to include about 2100 units fired by
coal, oil, and gas (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2000). Units are allocated
emissions allowances, each one of which authorizes its owner to emit one ton of S0 2

during a given year or any year thereafter. Overall emissions reductions are achieved
by limiting the number of allowances in circulation. S0 2 allowances can be bought
and sold or held for compliance purposes in future years. Sources cannot, however,
borrow against future allocations for present compliance purposes.
The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program con
tributes to the South Coast Air Quality Management District's (AQMD) efforts to
achieve federal ambient standards for ozone and particulate matter in the Los
Angeles airshed. RECLAIM was designed to reduce emissions of two pollutants,
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur oxide (SOx), from stationary sources that released
more than four tons of either pollutant in any year since 1990. By the end of the
1999 compliance year, RECLAIM covered 354 facilities (South Coast Air Quality
Management District, 200Ia). 3 The RECLAIM program started operations in
October 1993. By the year 2003, the program is expected to achieve reductions of
71% and 60% for NOx and SOx from 1994 levels by affected sources.
RECLAIM facilities are allocated RECLAIM Trading Credits (RTCs) for
each year. Overall reductions in NOx and SOx emissions are achieved by reducing
allocations of credits over time. Each credit allows the release of one pound of NOx
or SOx during a specified compliance year. Facilities may sell or buy credits as they
see fit. 4 No banking is allowed in the RECLAIM program-facilities may not borrow
credits from future allocations, and in contrast to the S0 2 program, they are not
allowed to save credits for use or sale in future compliance years.
Although the RECLAIM program is an emissions trading program, it also
includes emissions fees (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 2002, May
28). The applicable unit fees for both NOx and SOx emissions increase with a facil
ity's level of emissions. Economists usually think of emissions taxes as an alternative
method of incentive-based pollution control. In contrast, the RECLAIM taxes are
clearly intended to help finance the program. However, as we will discuss shortly,
these taxes probably have an impact on facilities' compliance incentives.

Compliance Incentives in an Emissions Trading Program
The overall goal of this article is to combine a conceptual understanding of
compliance incentives in emissions trading programs with the practice and perfor
mance of enforcing the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs to propose practical guidelines
for enforcing these programs. Stranlund and Chavez (2000) have recently proposed
an economic model of compliance incentives in a competitive emissions trading pro
gram, which yields several conceptual principles for enforcing emissions trading
programs. This section is based on their analysis.
They note that an important feature of the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs is
their reliance on self-reporting of emissions from the facilities themselves. 5 There
are, then, two ways in which a firm could be noncompliant: (1) an emissions viola
tion occurs when the firm fails to hold enough permits to cover its emissions, and
(2) a reporting violation occurs when the firm transmits erroneous emissions data.
To deter these violations, regulators have three basic instruments: (1) the monitor
ing of performance to identify incidences of noncompliance, (2) penalties for emis
sions violations, and (3) possible penalties for reporting violations.

Under these conditions, firms will choose how much pollution they will
emit, how much they will report emitting, and how many permits they will hold. It
is reasonable to assume that firms will make these decisions to minimize their
expected costs, which consist of emissions control costs, receipts or expenditures
from permit market transactions, and expected penalties from reporting and emis
sions violations. (A formal statement of a firm's decision problem is presented in the
Appendix). Because the existing literature on enforcing market-based environmen
tal programs has not yet been extended to dynamic environments, assume that emis
sions permits may not be banked for future use or sale. 6 Suppose further that per
mits are traded in a reasonably competitive environment; that is, no facility can exer
cise power in the permit market, and transactions costs associated with trading per
mits are minimal. Furthermore, facilities do not bear emissions fees as in the
RECLAIM program.
T he enforcement strategy required to maintain complete compliance in this
setting has two parts, both of which tie the enforcement variables to the prevailing
permit price. Denote the market price of permits as p; the probability that a source
will get audited, which is assumed to be sufficient to discover a violation if one
exists, as 7r, a per unit fine levied for emissions violations as J, and a per unit fine for
reporting violations as g. 7 Assume that the penalties are applied automatically when
violations are discovered. If the authorities wish to have complete compliance, there
are two conditions that must be satisfied: (I) p < 7r X Cf+ g) and (2) p < f.
The first condition provides firms with the proper incentive to submit
truthful reports of their emissions. To understand why, first note that the permit
price is the marginal benefit of noncompliance-it is the unit cost that is avoided
when a firm chooses not to hold enough permits to cover its emissions. Second, note
that if a firm misrepresents its emissions it is because it is motivated to cover up an
emissions violation rather than purchasing enough permits to be in compliance.
Therefore, the marginal benefit of misrepresenting a violation is the foregone cost of
being in compliance, which is the permit price p. If a firm's emissions and reporting
violations are discovered, it faces the per unit penalty J for its emissions violation
and the per unit penalty g for its reporting violation. The expected marginal cost of
falsifying an emissions report is therefore 7r X Cf+ g). Hence, a firm will provide a
truthful report of its emissions if the marginal benefit of under-reporting its emis
sions, p, is not greater than the expected marginal cost, 7r X Cf+ g).
Notice that the unit penalty for a reporting violation is not required to make
sure that a facility has the proper incentive to submit accurate emissions reports. In
fact, the 50 2 and RECLAIM regulations do not include explicit penalties for sub
mitting false emissions reports.
Guaranteeing accurate emissions reporting is only useful insofar as it serves
the primary goal of achieving complete emissions compliance so that every firm
holds enough permits to cover its emissions. In fact, firms will not hold enough per
mits to cover their emissions unless they have the correct incentive to submit truth
ful emissions reports. To understand why this is so, suppose that p > 7r X Cf + g)
so that a firm is not motivated to provide a truthful report of its emissions.

Obviously, if p > 7T' X (J + g), then p > 7T' X f. The permit price p represents a firm's
marginal benefit of not holding enough permits to cover its emissions, whereas f rep
resents the firm's expected marginal cost of holding too few permits. Since the mar
ginal benefit of the emissions violation outweighs its expected marginal cost, the
firm will choose to hold fewer permits than it needs to cover its emissions. This is
one of the most important lessons conveyed by this model of compliance incen
tives---facilities in a transferable permit system will not have the proper incentive to
be compliant unless the enforcement strategy they face also removes the incentive
to submit falsified emissions reports.
Although obtaining accurate emissions reports is necessary to induce com
pliance, it is not sufficient: The enforcement strategy must also satisfy p :Sf. Given
the proper incentive to provide a truthful emissions report, a firm that is in violation
will report the extent of its violation and will then be assessed the per unit penalty
f. Therefore, if the price of being compliant-the permit price-is less than or equal
to the certain marginal penalty for emissions violations, each firm will choose com
plete emissions compliance. If not, each firm will emit more pollution than the num
ber of permits it holds allows.
The enforcement strategy required to maintain complete compliance high
lights the importance of the prevailing permit price in determining compliance
behavior. In a reasonably competitive environment, the prevailing permit price com
pletely summarizes each facility's marginal benefit of noncompliance. Thus, a firm's
compliance incentives do not depend on anything specific about itself, including its
initial allocation of permits, its scale of operations, details about its production and
emissions-control technologies, or its costs of reducing emissions. 8 This suggests an
important principle for enforcing a competitive emissions trading program. Since
firm-specific details are not important components of their compliance incentives,
there is no reason for an enforcement authority to target its enforcement effort
because it suspects that some facilities may be more likely to be noncompliant than
others. 9 This is important because sources in a market-based pollution control pro
gram will often be very different in ways that one might expect would influence their
compliance incentives.
In imperfectly competitive environments, however, prevailing prices may
not convey all the necessary information about facilities' marginal benefits of non
compliance. Chavez (2000) shows that when a firm can exercise power in a permit
market, its compliance incentives also depend on the degree to which the firm can
manipulate permit prices. He also shows that significant transaction costs may also
cause firms' marginal benefits of noncompliance to deviate from prevailing permit
prices.
It is likely that the emissions fees faced by RECLAIM facilities will have the
same impact. Recall that these are per unit taxes that increase with a facility's level
of emissions. When faced with an emissions tax, a facility in an emissions trading
system has two reasons to be noncompliant: to avoid the cost of holding enough per
mits to cover its emissions, the marginal benefit of which is the market price of per
mits, and to avoid paying the emissions tax, the marginal benefit of which is the tax

rate. Thus, a facility's marginal benefit of noncompliance is the prevailing permit
price plus the emissions tax rate. This suggests two aspects of the RECLAIM taxes
that are important to keep in mind. First, when evaluating the compliance incentives
of RECLAIM facilities, we must realize that the emissions tax they pay is an addi
tional incentive to be noncompliant. Second, the differentiated tax rates suggests dif
ferentiated compliance incentives-since the larger sources of emissions pay higher
fees, they have a greater incentive to be noncompliant.
Noncompetitive elements aside, the importance of current permit prices in
determining compliance incentives also suggests an important principle for setting
penalties in competitive emissions trading programs. Instead of choosing fixed unit
penalties, it may be more effective to tie penalties to the prevailing permit price.
Since an effective enforcement strategy for a competitive trading system calls for set
ting p ::5 1r X (f + g), fixed unit penalties would require that monitoring (as cap
tured by the audit probability 1r) must keep pace with fluctuations in the prevailing
permit price. This may be a difficult task for enforcement authorities working with
limited budgets. Alternatively, marginal penalties could be tied directly to the pre
vailing permit price. Then, marginal penalties would vary with permit price fluctu
ations and serve to stabilize the monitoring requirement. 10

Enforcing the S02 and RECLAIM Programs

Additional guidelines for enforcing emissions trading programs can be
gleaned from analyzing the actual practice of enforcing these programs. At the sim
plest level, enforcement of any law is characterized by two components-monitor
ing to detect violations and assessing sanctions if a violation is found. In this section
we describe these components of the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs.

Monitoring in the S02 and RECLAIM Programs
Since the goal of enforcing an emissions trading program is basically to rec
oncile a facility's permit holdings with its total emissions over some compliance
period, monitoring to accomplish this goal involves keeping track of permit hold
ings and monitoring each source's emissions. In their essentials, the monitoring
strategies of the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs are quite similar. Both programs have
systems in place to track permit holdings. Emissions monitoring in both programs
relies heavily on data generated and reported by the facilities themselves. To moni
tor emissions accurately and to minimize the opportunities facilities may have to fal
sify reports of their emissions, both programs impose rather stringent technological
and process requirements.
All facilities in the S0 2 program are required to install continuous emis
sions monitoring systems (CEMS), or an equivalent device, to monitor their emis
sions. These systems are capable of providing a nearly continuous and very accurate
account of the volume of emissions leaving a facility. A unit's CEMS sends the emis
sions data to the utility's Data Acquisition and Handling System (DAHS), which col
lects and records the necessary measurements and formats the information elec
tronically into a quarterly report. These quarterly reports are submitted to the EPA
electronically. 11 The process for generating reports and submitting them to the EPA

is fully automated, thereby minimizing the opportunities for tampering with the
emissions data.
Monitoring by EPA officials is focused primarily on the facilities' emissions
reports, as well as their testing and maintenance reports. The EPA subjects every
emissions report to a series of reviews to verify its accuracy and to determine com
pliance. Audits appear to be done primarily of the source's reports rather than to
consist of site visits, although the EPA may conduct site audits to inspect CEMS
devices and review on-site operations and CEMS quality assurance records (U.S.
EPA, 2002f, August 9).
RECLAIM facilities are also required to install and maintain specific moni
toring and reporting equipment, but these requirements differ among types of
sources. Specifically, NOx sources are classified into four categories depending on
emissions levels: major sources, large sources, process units, and equipment. SOx
sources are classified into three categories: major sources, process units, and equip
ment.12 CEMS are required for all NOx and SOx major sources. Facilities in other
source-categories are required to install monitoring systems that are cheaper than
CEMS and that are correspondingly less accurate. NOx large sources must install a
device called a fuel flow meter. Process units and equipment categories for both NOx
and SOx sources are required to use fuel flow meters or timers for emissions moni
toring purposes. These devices are intended to produce periodic usage reports
(amount of fuel or time of utilization), which, combined with equipment emission
standards, are used to produce emissions reports (South Coast Air Quality
Management District, 1991) . 13
Estimated emissions must be reported to the AQMD with specified equip
ment and software. Major sources must use a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) to
telecommunicate data to the AQMD Central Station. The RTU collects data, per
forms calculations, generates the appropriate data files, and transmits the data to the
Central Station. Data for large sources and process units may be transmitted via
RTU; alternatively, sources may compile the data manually and transmit them to the
Central Station via modem.
At the end of each compliance year, RECLAIM authorities initiate audits for
the previous year. Evaluations of reported data focus on ensuring the accuracy of the
data and to check for incidences of noncompliance. Every single emissions report is
audited in every single year. Each of these reviews apparently includes site visits to
inspect equipment, monitoring devices, and operation records (South Coast Air
Quality Management District, 1998, 2000, 2001a).
The most difficult task of enforcing an emissions trading program is obtain
ing an accurate and continuous measure of the emissions of each facility.
Considering how much effort has gone into designing and maintaining the moni
toring and reporting requirement in the 50 2 and RECLAIM programs, it is clear that
policymakers are well aware of this.
Beyond the problem of estimating emissions, these data must be transmit
ted to enforcement authorities so that they can make a determination of compliance.
Our conceptual understanding of compliance incentives in emissions trading pro-

grams and the reporting requirements of the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs is that
both stress the importance of removing firms' incentives or opportunities to submit
falsified emissions reports. The compliance model suggests that this can be accom
plished by providing the correct incentives for truthful reporting, whereas the S0 2
and RECLAIM programs accomplish this with very stringent technology require
ments. Either way, it is clear that enforcement of any emissions trading program will
be effective only if enforcers are able to obtain truthful reports of emissions from reg
ulated facilities.

Sanctions in the 502 and RECLAIM Programs

To provide a deterrent against noncompliance in a transferable permit sys
tem, facilities whose emissions exceed their permit holdings for some compliance
period must face sanctions for these violations. The use of financial sanctions to
punish noncompliance in the S0 2 program is quite close to the way penalties are
applied in the model of compliance incentives described in the previous section. The
unit penalty in the 50 2 program is unique in the fact that it is to be applied auto
matically. The penalty was set at $2,000 per ton of excess emissions in 1990 and is
indexed to inflation. Consequently, in 1998 the penalty was $2,581 per ton of excess
emissions. In addition to the monetary penalty, a noncompliant utility must offset
the excess S0 2 emissions from its allowance allocation in the next year. 14
The most significant difference between the enforcement strategies of the
S0 2 and RECLAIM programs is the way sanctions for emissions violations are
applied. Whenever an audit reveals a RECLAIM facility to have emissions in excess
of its credit holdings, the facility is provided an opportunity to review the audit and
to present additional data to further refine the audit results. If, after that review, the
facility is judged to be noncompliant, the facility's allocation for the subsequent
compliance year is automatically reduced by the total amount of excess emissions.
In addition, the RECLAIM authorities may seek to impose administrative financial
penalties. Noncompliant facilities may face penalties of up to $500 for every 1,000pound exceedance for every day the exceedance persists. If the annual average price
of credits per ton of emissions reaches $8,000, then, perhaps recognizing the greater
incentive for sources to be noncompliant when credit prices are high, RECLAIM
authorities can apply the $500 penalty to every 500 pounds of excess emissions,
effectively doubling the available penalty. Imposition of the penalty depends on the
facts of a particular case, including the extent of excess emissions, apparent reason
for the exceedance, and the vigor with which a source moves to correct its viola
tion.15
It is clear that any financial penalties in the RECLAIM program will be
imposed on a case-by-case basis rather than applied automatically as in the S0 2 pro
gram. Because of the resulting uncertainty that facilities must have about the conse
quences they will face if they are noncompliant, it is difficult to judge the deterrence
value of the RECLAIM sanctions. We do know, however, that these sanctions pro
vide less of a deterrent against emissions violations than if they were fixed and
applied automatically. This is true because facilities will not base their compliance
decisions on the maximum penalty, but on their expectations of what penalty may

actually be applied, which, of course, will be some lower value than the available
penalty.

Compliance in the S02 and RECLAIM Programs
The enforcement strategies used in the S02 and RECLAIM programs have
been quite successful to this point. The SO2 program has apparently achieved a per
fect compliance record. Compliance rates in the RECLAIM program have ranged
between 85% and 95%.

Compliance in the S02 Program

The perfect compliance record of the S0 2 program is quite remarkable
when compared to other environmental policies. Our conceptual understanding of
the compliance incentives in emissions trading programs provides a partial expla
nation of why S0 2 facilities have always chosen to be fully compliant. 16
One of the most important messages conveyed by our understanding of
compliance incentives is that they depend critically on prevailing permit prices. The
reason is simple: The permit price in a well-functioning permit system is a facility's
marginal cost of acquiring enough permits to cover its emissions. When permit
prices are high, facilities have a greater incentive to be noncompliant, and when they
are low, facilities are more likely to be compliant.
Although price data from before the beginning of Phase I of the S0 2 pro
gram in 1995 suggests highly variable trading prices, by early in the first year of the
program, S0 2 allowance prices had converged so that allowances were trading at
roughly the same prices Qoskow, Schmalensee, & Bailey, 1998). Since then, current
vintage allowance prices have ranged from a low of $68 per ton in 1996 to over $200
per ton in 1999.17 During 2000, allowance prices fluctuated quite closely around
$150. 18
The marginal penalty for emissions violations in the S0 2 trading program
has always been many times higher than prevailing allowance prices. This implies
that the probability of detecting a violation necessary to achieve complete emissions
compliance 1T, which is determined from p ::5 1T X (f + g), can be very low. For
example, in 1998, prices for allowances ranged between $100 and $200 per
allowance. In the same year, the monetary penalty for excess emissions was $2,581
per unit. In addition, any excess emissions would have been offset in 1999, sug
gesting an additional per unit penalty for forfeited 1999 allowances equal to the pre
sent value of these allowances. Even if we do not account for this offset penalty, with
a probability of detecting a violation as low as 0.08, p < 1T X (f + g) would be sat
isfied and sources would have the correct incentive to provide accurate emissions
reports (even without a penalty for reporting violations). Given the effort expended
on monitoring and the stringency of the reporting requirements in the S0 2 program,
the actual probability of detecting reporting and emissions violations is probably
much higher.
We have noted that as long as p < 1T X (f + g) is satisfied, emissions com
pliance is a simple matter of comparing the prevailing allowance price p to the cer
tain unit penalty for emissions violations f. In the 1998 compliance year, for exam-

ple, p < f was easily satisfied because the unit value of the S02 sanctions was
between 13 and 27 times higher than prevailing allowance prices.
Our understanding of compliance incentives in emissions trading programs
confirms Becker's (1968) seminal insight about the substitutability between moni
toring for compliance and penalties for noncompliance. He pointed out that if mon
itoring is costly but setting penalties is not, the enforcement costs of maintaining
compliance can be minimized by setting marginal penalties at arbitrarily high levels
so that monitoring probabilities can be made arbitrarily small. There are very sound
theoretical and ethical reasons for why this strategy is not very practical, and per
haps for these reasons, the strategy is not observed in actual practice. 19 However, rel
ative to prices for S0 2 allowances, the marginal penalty for emissions violations in
the S0 2 program is very high. Thus, there is at least some precedence for setting
penalties for emissions violations that are many times greater than prevailing permit
prices. Within practical limits, therefore, the tradeoff between monitoring and
penalties can be exploited to reduce monitoring effort or to increase the deterrence
value of a particular monitoring strategy.
Because S0 2 sources may trade allowances dated for the future, we also
have some indication of future allowance prices and, hence, future compliance
incentives. Consider, for example, the results from the "7-year advance" auctions
held by the U.S. EPA. 20 The clearing prices for these auctions were about $168 a ton
in 1999, $55 per ton in 2000, and $105 a ton in 2001. For the same years, the clear
ing prices in the spot auctions were about $201, $126, and $174, respectively. This
information suggests that allowance prices in the near future will remain well below
the penalty for excess emissions. Therefore, it is likely that the perfect compliance
record of the S0 2 program will persist for some time.

Compliance in the RECLAIM Program
The RECLAIM program has experienced noncompliant firms from its
inception. In the early years, much of the noncompliance was attributed to misun
derstandings of the required protocols (South Coast A ir Quality Management
District, 1998). In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of classic non
compliance, that is, firms failing to purchase sufficient credits to cover their emis
sions. In the 1998 compliance year, 27 out 329 firms were noncompliant in NOx
emissions, whereas 31 out of 361 were noncompliant in 1999. In both years, all
firms were compliant in SOx emissions. 21
Simple mistakes early on are easily explained as stemming from lack of
experience with the RECLAIM rules. Explaining the more willful violations is not as
straightforward. However, using the incentive approach that we've taken, a plausi
ble explanation may start from the fact that effective prices for RECLAIM credits are
high and increasing. Average prices for a ton of NOx emissions during the first four
calendar years of the program were always below $250 but rose to $451 during the
1998 calendar year and to $1,827 in 1999. Average prices per ton of SOx were under
$150 during the first four years of the program but rose to about $300 in 1998 and
to $780 per ton in 1999. In 2000, prices for NOx credits rose dramatically: For com
pliance year 1999 NOx credits traded in 2000, the average price rose to $15,369 per

ton, whereas for 2000 NOx credits traded in 2000 the average price was $45,609.
Average prices for 2000 SOx credits traded in 2000 also increased but to a more
modest $2,462 per ton (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 2001a).
In addition, because of the emissions fees that RECLAIM facilities face,
their marginal benefits of noncompliance in the first 5 years of the program were
much higher than indicated by credit prices. Relative to RECLAIM credit prices from
1994 to 1998, the fees are not small. Furthermore, these fees vary with the amount
of pollution released. For annual emissions between 4 and 25 tons per year, the fees
are currently $171 and $203 per ton of NOx and SOx, respectively. When annual
emissions are between 25 and 75, the fees are $272 and $328 per ton of NOx and
SOx, respectively. Finally, for annual emissions greater than 75 tons, the fees are
$409 and $492 per ton of NOx and SOx, respectively. In 1998, the market price for
credits for a ton of SOx emissions was about $300. Because of the SOx emissions fee,
however, a small source of SOx faced an effective price of SOx emissions of just over
$500 per ton, while the effective price for a large source was nearly $800 per ton,
about 2.67 times higher than the prevailing credit price at the time. Of course, with
current credit prices many times higher than they were in 1998, the impact of the
emissions fees on RECLAIM facilities' compliance incentives has eroded substan
tially.
RECLAIM violations may also result from the fact that the monetary penal
ties for emissions violations are not fixed or automatic. Recall that stated monetary
penalties in the RECLAIM regulations are maximum administrative penalties and
that actual sanctions are to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The uncertainty that
RECLAIM facilities must then have about the consequences of their violations
lessens the deterrence value of these sanctions; that is, facilities' evaluations of their
expected marginal costs of noncompliance are probably substantially lower than if
the sanctions were fixed and applied automatically. Because of the relatively low
expected marginal costs of noncompliance that stem from the uncertainty of the
financial sanctions they may face, and the high marginal benefits of noncompliance
that are exacerbated by the RECLAIM emissions fees, it is quite possible that a num
ber of RECLAIM facilities have decided that the incentives they face do not warrant
their full compliance.
We are also somewhat pessimistic about the future performance of the
RECLAIM program. Not only will credit prices be quite high for the 2000 compli
ance year, they will remain high into the near future. The average price for 2003
NOx credits traded in 2000 was about $13,800, and the average price for 2003 SOx
credits traded in 2000 was nearly $3,000 per ton (South Coast Air Quality
Management District, 2001a). If there is no off-setting change in the RECLAIM
enforcement strategy, the compliance problems the program has experienced thus
far, though relatively few in number to this point in time, may very well increase in
the future.

Conclusions: Principles for Enforcing
Emissions Trading Programs
Taken together-a conceptual understanding of the compliance incentives
faced by firms in an emissions trading program, the practice of enforcing the S0 2
and RECLAIM programs, and the compliance performance of S02 and RECLAIM
facilities thus far-several guidelines for enforcing emissions trading programs
emerge.
Our approach to examining compliance incentives in emissions trading
programs stresses the importance of the prevailing permit price. In a competitive
trading environment, the prevailing permit price completely summarizes each facil
ity's marginal benefit of noncompliance. A number of guiding principles follow from
this observation. First, details about a firm's operations, such as its production and
emissions-control technologies, are not important components of their compliance
incentives. Therefore, there is no reason for an enforcement authority to target its
enforcement effort because it suspects that some facilities may be more likely to be
noncompliant than others, even though they may be quite heterogeneous. There is
no evidence that S0 2 and RECLAIM officials pursue some sort of targeted enforce
ment strategy.
Unfortunately, in noncompetitive environments-those in which permit
trades involve significant transaction costs, when a firm or group of firms can exer
cise power in a permit market, or when firms face differentiated emissions taxes as
in the RECLAIM program-prevailing permit prices may not convey all the neces
sary information about facilities' compliance incentives. Furthermore, these compli
cations may produce differentiated compliance incentives.
We have also made several suggestions for setting penalties in emissions
trading programs. First, since permit prices have such an important influence on
compliance incentives, to stabilize compliance incentives and corresponding
enforcement strategies in the face of permit price fluctuations, unit penalties for
emissions violations should be tied directly to prevailing permit prices. This sug
gestion may be particularly useful in the RECLAIM program, in which credit prices
have risen rapidly over the last couple of years. Unit penalties that follow credit
prices would offset the increasing incentive toward noncompliance that comes with
higher credit prices.
Second, these penalties should be substantially higher than prevailing per
mit prices. Certainly, the perfect compliance record of facilities in the S02 program
is due in large part to the fact that penalties in the S0 2 program have always been
many times higher than going allowance prices.
Third, the application of penalties should not produce uncertainty for firms
about the consequences of noncompliance. The fact that the unit penalty in the S0 2
program is fixed and applied automatically has probably been another contributing
factor to the perfect compliance record of S0 2 facilities. On the other hand, we sus
pect that the determination of penalties on a case-by-case basis in the RECLAIM pro
gram produces uncertainty for facilities about the consequences of noncompliance
and thus weakens the deterrence value of the RECLAIM enforcement strategy.

On the other side of the enforcement equation-monitoring for compli
ance-it is clear that a well-functioning emissions trading program requires contin
uous and reasonably accurate estimates of the emissions leaving each facility. The
designers of the enforcement components of the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs
addressed this difficulty by requiring emissions sources to install and maintain
advanced emissions monitoring systems. Furthermore, our understanding of com
pliance incentives in emissions trading programs makes it clear that enforcement of
any emissions trading program will be effective only if the incentive or opportuni
ties for falsifying emissions reports are removed. As with generating accurate emis
sions data, the S0 2 and RECLAIM programs addressed this issue with very stringent
technological and process requirements for submitting data to enforcement author
ities.
Although it is true that our understanding of the theory and practice of
enforcing emissions trading programs adds new insight into the problem, it is equal
ly true that this exercise reveals critical areas in which our knowledge is lacking.
Future research that addresses issues concerning the dynamics of compliance, mon
itoring accuracy, and the enforcement problems associated with implementing emis
sions trading programs in a wider variety of environmental policy problems than at
present is needed to help refine existing enforcement strategies and to design
enforcement strategies for new market-based policies.
The practice and theory of market-based environmental control has pro
gressed quite far since they were first proposed more than 30 years ago. However,
too little attention has been given to understanding the nature of the compliance
incentives inherent in these programs and to the manner in which these programs
are actually enforced. It is our hope that this work will help to bridge the gap
between the practice and theory of enforcing market-based environmental policies
and that it will help motivate policymakers and analysts alike to look for even more
innovative ways to ensure that market-based policies can achieve environmental
quality goals while conserving private and public resources.
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Appendix
The enforcement conditions presented in the text are derived by Stranlund
& Chavez (2000) using a static model of a risk-neutral firm that operates under a
competitive emissions trading program. The firm's costs of reducing emissions is
summarized by c(e), which is strictly decreasing and convex in its actual emissions
e. The standard interpretation of c(e) is as follows: Let e 0 be the firm's unconstrained
level of emissions and let 7T( e 0 ) be the firm's maximal profit in this setting. The cost
( ) = 7T(e 0) - 1T(e).
of holding its emissions toe < e 0 is then c e
Denote an emissions report as r. Let 10 be the number of permits that are
initially allocated to the firm, and letI be the number of permits that the firm holds
after trade. Assume that permits trade at a competitive price p. An emissions viola
tion occurs when a firm's emissions exceed the number of permits it holds (e - I>
0), and a reporting violation occurs when its actual emissions exceed its reported
emissions (e - r > 0). Assume that a firm never reports that its emissions violation
is greater than it actually is ( e - r 2: 0), and it never reports that it is over-compli
ant r
( - I 2: 0). These restrictions imply e 2: r 2: I > 0.
Given the per unit penalties,! and g defined in the text, if a firm reports an
emissions violation, a penalty off X (r - I) is imposed automatically. If a firm is
audited and found to have under-reported its emissions, a penalty for the reporting
violation, g X (e - r), is imposed, as well as the incremental penalty for its unre
ported emissions violation,f X (e - l) - f X (r - I) = f X (e - r).
The objective of a risk-neutral firm is to choose its emissions (e), its emis
sions report (r), and permit demand (I) to minimize c(e) + p X I
( - 1 0 ) + f X (r I) + 7T X [g X (e - r) + f X (e - r )], subject toe 2: r 2: I> 0. The enforcement
strategy presented in the text follows from the analysis of the Kuhn-Tucker condi
tions for this problem. A formal proof is available from the authors. Alternatively,
one may consult Stranlund & Chavez (2000).
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1 The idea that market-based pollution control policies can achieve environmental
quality goals in a less expensive way than traditional command-and-control policies origi
nates with Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968). Montgomery (1972) provided the first rigorous
theoretical justification for the use of market-based polices. A number of economists have
turned the theoretical literature into practical guides for policymakers (Hahn, 1989; Hahn &
Noll, 1982; Tietenberg, 1985; Tripp & Dudek, 1989).
2 A wealth of information about the U.S. Acid Rain Program, including the 50
2
Allowance Trading Program can be found on the Internet at http://www.epa.gov/airmar
kets/arp/.
3 Facilities under RECLAIM are divided into two cycles with compliance schedules
that are staggered by 6 months. Compliance years for Cycle 1 facilities run from January 1

through December 31, and Cycle 2 compliance years are from July 1 through June 30. Thus,
the 1999 compliance year ran from January 1, 1999, to June 30, 2000.
4 There is a single spatial restriction on trading credits. Specifically, a facility in Zone
1 (the coastal zone) may only obtain credits from other Zone 1 facilities, whereas a facility in
Zone 2 (the inland zone) may obtain credits from either Zone 1 or 2 [Regulation XX
RECLAIM, Rule 2005, (e)J (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 2001b, May 30).
5 Despite the prevalence of self-reporting requirements in the enforcement of envi
ronmental policies, only a few other authors have examined the role of these requirements,
and all have done so in the context of enforcing standards (Harford, 1987; Malik, 1993;
Kaplow & Shavell, 1994; Livernois & McKenna, 1999).
6 Future work that examines how dynamic choices involving permit banking,
longer-term investments in production and pollution control technologies, and ongoing rela
tionships between facilities and enforcers affect firms' compliance incentives would probably
reveal ways in which enforcement strategies can be refined to exploit these dynamic elements.
7 Nearly all of the economic literature on enforcement sidesteps the problem of
monitoring accuracy. Clearly, however, obtaining reasonably accurate accounts of firms' emis
sions will be a critical component of any market-based environmental policy. This is another
important issue that future research should address.
Although one can imagine other penalty structures (assuming increasing marginal
penalties is common in the literature), the assumption of constant marginal penalties is con
sistent with actual penalty structures in the 502 and RECLAIM programs.
8 This is not to say that these factors play no role in a firm's choices. They will obvi
ously affect its choice of emissions. However, several authors have noted that these factors
will not affect a firm's compliance decisions, that is, whether it submits a truthful emissions
report or whether it holds enough permits to be compliant (Malik, 1990; Stranlund &
Dhanda, 1999; Stranlund & Chavez, 2000).
9 In contrast, Garvie & Keeler (1994) demonstrate that enforcement of command
and-control emissions standards should monitor firms with high marginal abatement costs
more closely than those with low marginal abatement costs.
1 For example, suppose that the marginal penalty for a reporting violation is cho

°

sen to beg = yp, where y > 0, and the marginal penalty for an emissions violation is f = </Jp,
where¢> 1 to satisfy the requirement that p < f. To satisfy p < 'TT X (f + g), a constant audit
probability 7T > 1/( y + ¢) will guarantee complete compliance, and is independent of fluc
tuations of the permit price. Because permit prices will fluctuate to some degree during a
compliance period, in practice, penalties could be tied to some average price during the peri
od. If there is a reconciliation period following each compliance year as in the 502 and
RECLAIM programs, marginal penalties could be tied to the average price during this grace
period.
11 Other requirements include initial equipment certification procedures, periodic
quality assurance and quality control procedures, and procedures for filling in missing data.
The approach for estimating emissions when monitoring equipment is not working properly
is designed to overestimate emissions to keep downtime of the monitoring systems to a min
imum (U.S. EPA, 2002c, July l; 2002d, July 1).
12 Detailed descriptions of the types of sources in each category are contained in
Regulation XX-RECLAIM, Rule 2011 (c), (d) and (e), and Rule 2012 (c) and (d) (South Coast

Air Quality Management District, 2001b, May 30). A 1996 audit of emissions revealed that
major NOx sources were responsible for 84% of RECLAIM NOx emissions, while major SOx
sources represented almost 98% of total RECLAIM SOx emissions (South Coast Air Quality
Management District, 1998).
13 Maintenance and testing procedures for all monitoring equipment are required
for each year. As in the S02 program, RECLAIM rules also include an upwardly biased
approach for estimating emissions when monitoring equipment is not working properly.
14 To help facilities avoid these sanctions, facilities in the S0 program have 60 days
2
at the end of each compliance year to acquire allowances if they have a shortfall, or to sell or
save allowances if they hold more than they need (U.S. EPA, 2002b,July 1). RECLAIM facil
ities also enjoy a 60-day reconciliation period at the end of each compliance year, as well as
30-day reconciliation periods after each of the first three quarters of the year [Regulation XX
RECLAIM, Rule 2004 (b) and (c)] (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 2001b,
May 30).
15 Consult Regulation XX RECLAIM, Rule 2004 (d) for the definition of violations,
and Rule 2010 (c) for procedures for assessing administrative penalties. The AQMD may also
impose additional permit conditions to prevent further violations [Regulation XX-RECLAIM,
Rule 2010 Cb), 1 and 2] (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 2001b, May 30).
It cannot explain, however, the significant amount of aggregate overcompliance
in every year of the S02 program. During Phase I, aggregate emissions were between 23% and
39% lower than current allowance allocations. As a percentage of allowable emissions-the
current allocation of allowances plus allowances saved from previous compliance years
aggregate emissions fell to only 30% in 1999 (U.S. EPA, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). This
is due to the fact that the rapid increase in the stock of banked allowances has far outpaced
the more modest decrease in the aggregate allocation of allowances. Since the model of com
pliance incentives in emissions trading programs does not allow for permit banking, it can
not explain aggregate overcompliance in the S02 program.
16

17 Information on allowance prices can be found at U.S. EPA, 2002e, July 1. The
current vintage is defined as those allowances that can be used to cover current emissions. In
other words, it includes allowances allocated for the current period plus banked allowances
from previous compliance years.
18 One of the surprises of the S0 program is that allowance prices have been much
2
lower than they were expected to be before allowance trading began. Explaining this has been
a major focus of the literature (Burtraw, 1996; Ellerman & Montero, 1998; Ellerman,
Schmalensee,Joskow, Montero, & Bailey, 1997, especially section VI).
19 Cohen (1999, section 3) and Macauley and Brennan (1998, section 3.3.2) discuss

limits to setting arbitrarily high penalties, both with reference to enforcing environmental
policies.
20 Results of annual auctions can be found at U.S. EPA, "Acid Rain Program
allowance auctions," (2002a,July 1). As the name suggests, "?-years advance" allowances can
first be used for compliance purposes 7 years into the future.
21 In aggregate, RECLAIM facilities have also been significantly overcompliant.
Aggregate emissions of SOx as a percentage of allowable emissions credits were about 70% in
1994, rose steadily to about 90% in 1998, and are expected to be around 92% for the 1999
compliance year. Similarly, in 1994, aggregate SOx emissions were about 63% of allowable
emissions, rising to 85% in 1998, and are expected to be about 99% of allowable emissions in

1999 (South Coast Air Quality Management District, 2001a). Since the model of compliance
incentives focuses on achieving exact compliance, it cannot explain why some RECLAIM
facilities have chosen to be overcompliant while others have been noncompliant.
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